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The economic decline that accompanied Mexico’s independence p rob ­
ably began in the 1780s. It lasted nearly a century. As industrial revolu­
tions stimulated econom ic advance in the N orth  Atlantic countries, 
Mexico slipped farther and still farther behind. M exico’s decline in this 
era determ ined the m agnitude o f the productivity gap that has separated 
the Mexican econom y from the developed world ever since. If Mexico 
had managed to  achieve a rate o f economic grow th equal to that o f  its 
northern  neighbor between 1800 and 1860, then the country’s 1950 per 
capita income would have been achieved by 1900 and Mexico would now 
rank am ong the w orld’s m ost developed economies with a per capita 
income comparable to  that o f Italy or even the U nited K ingdom . Instead, 
M exico’s per capita G D P  fell from roughly half that o f the U nited States 
in 1800 to  less than one seventh by I860 and has fluctuated around that 
level ever since (Coatsw orth 1978: 82).
Major institutional changes accompanied M exico’s economic decline. 
The Spanish Cortes enacted legislation between 1811 and 1813 that took 
the Bourbon assault on corporate privilege to  a new stage by disestab­
lishing the guilds, ending ethnic restrictions on em ploym ent, and abol­
ishing the Indian head tax {tributo). W ith  independence came proclama­
tions o f the legal equality o f citizens (save clerics and military officers) 
and the abolition o f entail and titles o f nobility. Public enforcem ent o f 
the Church tithe ended in 1833. Corporate property and the ecclesiastical 
and military fueros were abolished in 1856 and 1857. T he liberalization of 
trade that began under the Bourbons was extended to  open direct trade 
with allies and neutrals during the wars o f the French Revolution and 
N apoleon. Independence opened Mexico to the commerce o f the world, 
ended enforcem ent o f laws restricting imm igration and foreign resi­
dency, and reduced colonial restrictions on the im portation o f capital. In ­
ternal m onopolies, like the tobacco estanco, were maintained and revived 
from tim e to  time, but w ithout success; by the 1850s, these, too, had 
disappeared. In short, Mexico took  major steps toward eliminating insti-
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tutional obstacles to  m odern capitalist developm ent during this period 
o f economic decline. In fact, econom ic decline actually encouraged 
experim entation and underm ined all attem pts to  revive colonial institu­
tions and policies (W alker 1984).
This essay will analyze changes in the Mexican econom y from the late 
colonial period to approxim ately I860. Its purpose is to  contribute to 
knowledge o f  the dim ensions o f M exico’s econom ic decline and to 
understanding o f  its causes. The analysis will rely, in part, on new esti­
mates o f M exico’s gross dom estic product (G D P ) in 1800,1845 and I860. 
The estimates are based partly on fact and partly on disciplined guess­
work. They provide rough indicators o f  sectoral ou tpu t for each o f  these 
benchmark years. W hile the estimates inevitably contain substantial 
error margins, they mark an advance over the implicit quantification of 
literary accounts by providing explicit and testable calculations upon 
which future research can im prove as m ore and better data become avail­
able.
In the first section below, the origins o f  M exico’s economic decline are 
located in the late colonial era. The second section reviews the dem o­
graphic and territorial changes that followed independence. The follow­
ing sections present the new  G D P  estimates and discuss the changes in 
ou tpu t and structure they reveal. The final sections analyze the develop­
m ent o f  the external sector and contain som e concluding com ments.
I. TH E O R IG IN S  OF DECLINE
It has become com m onplace to contrast the “harm ony and prosperity” of 
the colonial era to the conflict and depression o f  independent Mexico 
(Rodriguez 0 . 1983). This contrast is essentially inaccurate. The research 
o f the past two decades points clearly to  a sustained econom ic decline in 
the last decades o f  the colonial era. Indeed, nearly all o f the factors cited 
by historians to explain post-independence econom ic trends were 
powerfully at w ork decades before the G rito de Dolores.
The second half o f the eighteenth century w itnessed im portant changes 
in agricultural production and productivity. In the Guadalajara region, 
the Bajío, the Central Valley, and elsewhere as well, population grow th 
and urban dem and caused a w idespread shift from extensive agriculture 
and livestock production to  m ore intensive production o f  food grains, 
especially maize and w heat (Van Young 1981: chap. 10; Brading 1973; 1978: 
chap. 8; K onrad 1980: chap. 8). The livestock frontier m oved north o f  the
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Bajío, and the land thus freed w ent under the plough. Costs rose as yields 
declined and producers had to pay for transportation from m ore distant 
fields to  urban markets. The earlier gains from regional specialization 
were lost, and the agricultural sector began to experience a steady decline 
in productivity. The famine o f  1784-85, and the crop failures that occurred 
with increasing regularity thereafter, were due no t only to climatic vicissi­
tudes but to  the greater variability o f crop yields as m ore and m ore margi­
nal land was pu t into production (Florescano 1969)- 
To declining productivity in agriculture, it is necessary to  add the evi­
dence o f trouble in the m ining industry. I have already po in ted  to the 
problem  o f rising marginal costs, that is, to  the increasing cost o f produc­
ing each ounce o f  silver and gold (Coatsw orth 1986; G arner 1980). 
G overnm ent subsidies, in the form o f tax relief, soft loans, and lower 
prices for the mercury and gunpow der supplied by governm ent m onop­
olies prolonged the life o f many mines. But the prosperity o f  the industry 
depended m ore and m ore on governm ent aid, and Spain’s capacity to 
continue the subsidies disappeared in the decade after H idalgo’s revolt. 
The collapse o f production in 1811 may be attributed to  Hidalgo; the 
industry’s failure to recover in the final years o f colonial rule had m ore to 
do w ith econom ic factors and declining governm ent aid.
Foreign com petition began its long war against M exico’s artesanal and 
industrial producers long before independence, too. Salvucci (1986) 
has docum ented the collapse o f  w oolen textiles by the end o f the eigh­
teenth  century. C otton textile production faced foreign com petition as 
early as the American W ar for Independence. C om petition intensified 
during the wars o f the French Revolution and N apoleon, and outpu t 
began to suffer well before independence, as T hom son (Ms. 1978: chaps. 
2 and 3; 1986) has shown. In a declining economy, alternative em ploy­
m ent for the resources idled in textile production were simply unavail­
able.
T he chief malady attributed to Independence has been political instabi­
lity and the attendant evils o f arbitrary taxation and the lack o f security 
for enterprise. N either o f these evils was new. Nostalgia for a colonial era 
o f  peaceful productivity can only be sustained by failing to  notice that the 
colony was part o f  a vast em pire sustained only by war against increas- 
ingly powerful European com petitors (Rodriguez O. 1983). The fiscal 
extortions o f the Bourbon reforms and the increasingly destructive eco­
nom ic regulation required to enforce them  were com pounded by Spain’s 
desperation after 1796. In the decade after 1800, the full range o f  arbitrary 
taxes and forced loans that so cursed the Independence era were im-
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posed by the colonial authorities to  support the war effort. The m ost 
destructive o f these measures, the consolidación de vales reales, did as much 
to destroy the colony’s incipient capital m arket as any o f  the measures 
im posed by warring caudillos in the half century after independence. 
Moreover, the colonial governm ent provided virtually no services to  its 
constituents, not even internal security. O rder collapsed alm ost as soon 
as it was challenged. Banditry, largely a product o f econom ic distress, 
escalated after the famine o f  the 1780s and again in the period following 
the Hidalgo revolt. Colonial officials were virtually powerless to stop it.' 
In short, m ost o f the ills associated w ith Independence, both  economic 
and political, had their origins in the colonial era.
II. PO PU LA TIO N  A N D  NATURAL RESOURCES
The colony adm inistered from  Mexico City covered nearly 4.5 million 
square kilometers, twice the area o f the newly independent U nited States 
o f America. The Mexican republic which adm inistered this vast territory 
after 1821 was the largest o f the new nations to emerge from the wreck o f 
Spain’s em pire in the New World.
In the three decades after independence, Mexico lost half its national ter­
ritory to  its aggressive northern  neighbor. T he loss o f Texas encom pas­
sed m ore than a million square kilom eters. An additional 1.4 million 
square kilom eters were ceded by the Treaty o f Guadalupe Hidalgo in 
1848. In 1853, 80,000 square kilom eters were sold to the U nited States 
(the G adsden Purchase) to  assure N orth  American entrepreneurs that a 
new transcontinental railroad to  California could be constructed entirely 
on U.S. territory. In that year, the territory o f the Mexican republic fell 
below two million square kilom eters, while that o f the U.S.A. reached 
nearly 8 million. From twice as large in 1800, Mexico fell to  one-fourth the 
size o f  her northern neighbor.2
The loss o f Texas, the N ew  Mexico territories and U pper California 
deprived the Mexican nation o f im m ense natural resources. The full 
ex ten t o f this loss first came to light in the year Mexico lost the war with 
the United States. The California “gold rush” began in 1848. W ithin two
1 William R. Taylor describes the rise o f banditry in the Guadalajara region (Taylor 
1988).
2 Data on the territorial expansion of the United States are found in Historical Statis­
tics (i960: 236).
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decades, the lost territories were producing m ore precious metals than 
all the fabled “silver m ountains” o f old Mexico. By 1900, the mineral o u t­
p u t alone o f the lost territories exceeded the national income o f  the 
Mexican republic.3
Since the territories lost were sparsely populated, M exico’s human 
resources were little affected. In 1800, Alexander von H um bold t esti­
m ated the population o f N ew Spain and the northern  provinces at more 
than six million.4 Table 1 presents population estimates for Mexico from 
1800 to 1862.
A t the end o f the colonial era, Mexico’s population was growing slowly. 
T he slow pace o f population grow th continued into the Independence 
era. Between 1800 and the 1860s, the annual average increase was only 0.6 
percent. As Mexico lost vast natural resources, the country’s stock of 
hum an capital stagnated. N either in numbers, nor in skills or education, 
did the country’s population increase much in the first four decades o f 
independence.
III. TR EN D S IN  G D P
Table 2 presents the new estimates o f M exico’s gross dom estic product 
m entioned above. Detailed estimates for each sector may be found below 
in the text and in Table 14. In 1800, gross dom estic product stood at 
roughly 240 million pesos at current prices, or 333 million pesos o f 1900. 
In com parison to the U nited States and G reat Britain, Mexico’s per capita 
p roduct was low, one half that o f the U nited States and barely one third 
o f  British per capita product (Coatsw orth 1978: 82). Large as it was in 
1800, however, the gap between Mexico and the developed countries 
would never be so narrow again.
Between 1800 and 1845, M exico’s real national income stagnated, falling 
som e two percent. In per capita terms, however, the fall was much larger 
(21.6 percent). This decline continued through I860 (and probably to  the 
end o f 1860s).
In com parison to 1800, M exico’s total G D P  had fallen by five percent in
3 In 1850, total U.S. production o f gold and silver amounted to U.S. $ 55,148,730, 
nearly all o f it produced in the former Mexican territories (Historical Statistics I960: 
371). In the same year, less than 20 million pesos were minted in Mexico; see Table 
10 below. Mineral output o f the United States is reported in ibid. (i960: 360-369).
4 See Table 1.
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I860. Population grow th in the meanwhile brought per capita real 
income dow n to a level nearly 30 percent below that o f  1800.
W hen it becomes possible to  construct estimates for the intervening 
years, a m ore precise view o f  short-term  fluctuations will be possible. It is 
likely, for example, that per capita income in the colony began to  decline 
as early as the 1780s. W hen the independence m ovem ent broke ou t in 
1810, the short-term  decline, especially in m ining and governm ent reve­
nues was especially sharp.5 Partial recoveries probably took  place in the 
late 1820s and again in the late 1830s and early 1840s.6 From 1845 to I860, 
econom ic activity declined again, in part due to the U.S. invasion (1846- 
48) and the internal W ar o f  the Reform (1858-61). Between these two 
wars, another partial recovery may have occurred, only to be reversed. 
Between 1845 and I860, total income fell 3.5 percent, while per capita 
product fell nine percent. By I860, M exico’s econom y had reached the 
lowest po in t for which estimates are available.
These estimates o f  gross dom estic product are the result o f  efforts to 
reconstruct ou tpu t sector by sector. The results o f these efforts are p re ­
sented in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
The sector that suffered least as the economy declined after 1800 was 
probably agriculture. The estimates o f agricultural production are based 
on scattered data that make it possible to  calculate per capita production 
or consum ption. They are thus in tended to  include all output, w hether 
m arketed or not. Table 6 presents the data on which the maize estimates 
are based. T he earliest national estimate is that o f  Q uirós (1973) listed for 
1800, but actually estim ated by the author as an “average” for the period 
before the Hidalgo revolt. The Quirós estimate is consistent w ith later 
data on national consum ption per capita, as the table shows. The 1845 
and I860 figures (125 kilos per capita) em body the assum ption that staple 
production could not have declined much, given low income elasticity o f 
dem and for basic foodstuffs. For I860, however, Pérez Hernández (1862: 
103) gives a figure which is far lower (approxim ately 70 kilos per capita). 
This figure is much closer to  the consum ption per capita in Mexico City, 
where a substantial m inority o f the population consum ed w heat rather
5 See Table 10 below.
6 The evidence available to document short-term trends is limited. Foreign trade 
and governm ent revenues increased in the 1820s, and mining production also 
recovered somewhat; see below, Tables 10 and 12. For governm ent revenues, see 
Carmagnani (1982).Thomson (Ms. 1978: chap. 3) documents increased activity in 
Puebla’s cotton textile industry in the late 1830s and early 1840s.
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than maize. For the nation as a whole, higher estimates for 1845 and I860 
are m ore reasonable.
Table 7 presents the per capita consum ption and production data on 
which the estimates for wheat, rye and sugar are based. For wheat, con­
sum ed mainly in cities, the urban data contain a bias opposite to  that 
encountered in the maize data. Q uirós estim ated national w heat con­
sum ption at 25 kilos per capita, less than one fifth the 1792 census esti­
m ate o f  138.1 kilos for Mexico City.7 An independent estim ate o f  wheat 
production, that o f Ortiz de Ayala based on Guadalajara data for 1802, pu t 
national ou tpu t close to  the Quirós estimate, viz., 1,400,000 cargas, or 
21.47 kilos per capita (Ortiz de Ayala 1968: 49-53). The data from the Por- 
firian era are also quite close to the Quirós estimate, fluctuating around 
20 kilos per capita between 1892 and 1907.
For 1845 and I860 w heat ou tpu t there are no reliable figures. Pérez H er­
nández (l862 : 103) estim ated w heat production per capita at 27.9 kilos, a 
figure that seems overly optim istic (in contrast to  his low estimate o f 
maize production). Instead, national w heat consum ption per capita is set 
at much lower levels for the two missing years. Lower levels are consist­
en t with widespread evidence o f  decline in estate agriculture (especially 
during the 1850s); since w heat was an exclusively estate product that 
required irrigation and special care, these lower levels appear to  be m ore 
plausible.8
The estimates o f ou tpu t for the remaining agricultural products are 
based on similar sources and m ethods. The m ost problem atical are the 
estimates o f  sugar production for 1845 and I860. W hile there is no evi­
dence to  suggest a notable increase in production, and the estimates 
em ployed are consistent with contem porary sources, the “boom ” in the 
1870s is unlikely to  have raised ou tpu t from  the 60,000 tons indicated by 
Pérez Hernández for I860 to  the 600,000 tons estim ated for 1877.9 The 
I860 figure is probably too  small, and the 1877 estimate too  large, but evi­
dence is lacking to  determ ine the am ount o f the correction required. 
The sectoral estimates o f  G D P  in Table 3 suggest that the agricultural 
sector w ithstood the turm oil o f  the Independence period better than any 
other. The share o f  agriculture in G D P  rose from 21.9 to 27 percent, accor­
ding to  the estimates; while G D P  declined by nearly 30 percent per
7 Quirós (1973: 236); the Revillagigedo census data are in Orozco y Berra (1973:7l).
8 On the fragmentation of the large estates, see Brading (1978: chap. 8) and Bazant 
(1971).
9 On the boom  in sugar production in the 1870s, see Calderón (1965 : 47-49).
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capita, agricultural ou tpu t declined only 12.5 percent between 1800 and 
1860. Caution is needed, however, in interpreting the data, since the esti­
mates o f  agricultural ou tpu t actually em body the assum ption that food 
production per capita did not decline by much.
Livestock production appears to  have suffered far m ore than agriculture. 
Table 8 presents data on per capita m eat consum ption similar to  those 
used for the agricultural estimates. The data suggested sharp declines in 
the consum ption o f m utton and pork  and a smaller decline in beef con­
sum ption. These estim ates are little m ore than guesswork. The 1800 esti­
mates are based on Quirós (1973: 236). The I860 beef estimate takes the 
ratio o f Mexico City consum ption in 1792 to national consum ption in 
1800 and applies it to  I860 when only Mexico City data are available. The 
1845 estimate merely interpolates a round number. The estimates for 
m utton  and pork  production em ploy the same m ethod. T he Pérez H er­
nández (1862: 117) estimates for I860 for all three products are higher 
(see table), but are rejected again for their urban bias.
A variety o f sources were used to  construct estimates o f  other livestock 
products. Quirós and Pérez Hernández provided the starting po in t in 
each case.10 In m ost cases, independent sources and data from  the Porfi- 
riato established reasonable boundaries for the estimates.
In contrast to  agriculture, the estim ates o f livestock production suggest a 
sharp decline, much sharper in the case o f ganado menor than in beef cattle 
production. Cattle production did not fall until after the U.S. invasion. As 
a p roportion  o f  G D P, livestock production fell from  19-4 to  12.4 between 
1800 and I860. T he w eight o f agriculture and livestock together remained 
virtually unchanged over this period, as the decline in the livestock share 
was roughly m atched by the rising share o f  agriculture. Together, these 
tw o sectors accounted for roughly 40 percent o f G D P  throughout this 
period: 41.3 percent in 1800, 44.4 in 1845 and 39-4 in I860.
Artisanal and industrial production, the m anufacturing sector, accounted 
for a far larger share o f M exico’s G D P  than m ost accounts have sug­
gested. Table 9 provides detailed data on the estimates constructed 
industry by industry. A num ber o f industrial activities are no t included in 
the estimates for this sector because they could not be distinguished in 
the data on agricultural and mineral output. Flour milling, one o f the 
country’s im portant industries, cannot be estim ated apart from the value 
o f  the agricultural input. The estimates o f  w heat p roduction in the agri­
cultural sector above actually include the value added by this processing
10 See Table 8.
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industry. Even w ithout it, however, the food processing industry emerges 
as the single m ost im portant industrial sector. N ext in im portance was 
the “chemical industry” that produced soap, gunpow der, vegetable oils 
and candles, am ong o ther products.
The m anufacturing estimates are based on a num ber o f  sources and 
represent value-added estimates constructed by subtracting the value o f 
raw materials inputs (that is, the corresponding estimates o f  agricultural 
or livestock production). M ost o f  the figures are adjusted from the data 
in the Quirós and Pérez Hernández w orks.11 The 1845 data are based on 
official sources that only provide inform ation on the textile and iron, 
steel and m unitions industries.12
Except for parts o f the textile industry that began a short-lived m odern­
ization process in the 1830s and early 1840s, the m anufacturing sector 
consisted chiefly o f  small-scale artisan w orkshops or cottage “industries”. 
Little technological change occurred during this period, save for those 
enterprises that received Banco de Avío aid to im port equipm ent in the 
1830s.13 The effects o f  this conservative program  were not impressive. 
M ost o f the textile mills that m odernized in this period w ent bankrupt.1,1 
T he largest establishm ents, outside the sugar and flour mills and the 
m ine smelters were the tobacco “factories”. In the late eighteenth cen­
tury, the Royal Tobacco Factory in Mexico City em ployed over 3,000 
people. After independence, tobacco processing continued as a public 
sector m onopoly leased to  private entrepreneurs under various contracts 
until 1856. Tobacco factories did no m ore than unite under one roo f the 
processing activities formerly carried ou t in scores o f individual tobacco 
shops. N o technical advance was created by factory production (W alker 
1984).
As a p roportion  o f  G D P, manufacturing remained virtually unchanged 
from 1800 to  I860, fluctuating around 20 percent. M anufacturing activity 
declined at about the same rate as G D P  during this period.
11 Quirós (1973: 262-263); Pérez Hernández (1862: chap. 9). See also Rosenzweig 
Hernández (1963). I have followed Rosenzweig’s approach closely; this work is 
the pioneer in historical reconstruction o f economic activity for Mexico.
12 Memoria de Industria (1845 [1846] : 52-57). I have accepted the conclusion ofKere- 
mitsis that the estimates in this report understate textile production; the Keremit- 
sis revisions are thus employed in the G D P estimate. See Keremitsis (1973: 38-39).
13 See also Burks (Ms. 1952: chaps. 9-10); Potash (1959: chaps. 3-4); Bazant (1964b). 
The best discussion of the textile industry, however, is in Thom son (Ms. 1978: 
chaps. 2-3).
14 The m ost detailed account o f the losses suffered by entrepreneurs in the textile 
industry can be found in Walker (1986: chap. 6).
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The same was true for the m ining industry, which accounted for a much 
smaller proportion  o f G D P  than either agriculture or manufacturing. 
Official estimates o f the production o f gold and silver are displayed in 
Table 10. The official estimates only include the ou tpu t that reached the 
mints. Literary evidence suggests that small quantities o f  gold and silver 
were diverted to contraband before reaching the mint. Actual ou tput 
may have been higher than the official figures indicate. In som e years, the 
governm ent legalized the export o f unm inted gold and silver. This was 
true for 1845 and I860, for example, so data on exports o f unm inted gold 
and silver are added to  the m int figures in the G D P  estim ates.15 
The m ining sector also produced small quantities o f  copper, lead, tin, 
iron, mercury, and such non-metallic minerals as salt. Estimates o f these 
items are also included in the m ining sector totals.
This sector suffered a sharp decline in ou tpu t after 1810, but by 1845 the 
1800 ou tpu t o f  precious metals had already been equalled. In per capita 
term s, however, m ining o u tpu t was substantially lower than in 1800 (16.3 
percent) as late as I860. This sector did no t regain its 1800 level o f per 
capita ou tpu t until the late 1880s. As a p roportion  o f  G D P, m ining fell 
from 8.2 percent in 1800 to 6.2 percent in 1845.M odestgrow th thereafter, 
while the economy was still declining, raised the figure to  9-7 percent o f 
G D P  in I860, higher than in 1800.
Together, m ining and manufacturing represented between a quarter and 
a third o f G D P  in this period. In 1800, these two sectors together 
accounted for 30.5 percent o f GDP. Both fell faster than the econom y as 
a whole, reaching 24.5 percent in 1845 and recovering to 31.3 percent 
in I860.
Estimates reported in Table 3 for the forestry, fish and game, construc­
tion, transportation, and commercial sectors o f  the Mexican economy in 
this period represent m ore guesswork than hard data. Forestry and fish 
and gam e estimates are found in bo th  Q uirós (1973: 262) and Pérez H er­
nández (1862: chap. 5). The 1845 figures are interpolated. The construc­
tion, transportation and commercial sectors are calculated on the basis of 
the w eight o f these sectors in M exico’s G D P  after 1895.16 It is likely that 
this procedure underestim ates the o u tpu t o f  these sectors. The largest o f 
them , commerce, could have accounted for m ore than a quarter o f GDP,
15 The export o f metals en pasta is described in Mayer (185 3, II: 99). Pérez Hernández 
gives a figure for unm inted precious metals exports for 1857; this is added to the 
m int figures for I860 and in the G D P estimate; see Pérez Hernández (1862:135).
16 Sectoral weights beginning in 1895 may be found in Solis (1969: 12).
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if Mexico’s econom y followed patterns familiar in the less developed 
w orld.17 The trend after 1895 was up, with the commercial sector rising 
from 17 to nearly 20 percent within the next two decades (Solis 1969:12). 
Altogether, the three sectors for which data is totally lacking account for 
20.1 percent o f the G D P  estimates in each o f the three years.
The public sector o f the Mexican econom y in this period represented a 
smaller p roportion  o f  G D P  than in Europe at the same tim e.18 In 1800, 
however, the G D P  estimate excludes nearly half the revenues collected 
by the viceregal governm ent because they were exported from the 
colony as net fiscal revenues to subsidize Spanish adm inistration in other 
parts o f  the em pire or to swell the coffers in Madrid (H um bold t 1966a, 
IV: 224-229). Revenues actually spent in N ew  Spain am ounted to  only 
about 2.35 pesos o f 1900 per capita, lower than in 1845 or I860. As a p ro ­
portion  o f GD P, governm ent spending inside the country increased dra­
matically, from 4.2 percent in 1800 to  roughly seven percent thereafter 
(7.4 percent in 1845 and 6.8 percent in I860). In term s o f  the govern­
m en t’s capacity to  extract resources, the data suggest a small decline 
(from  7.8 percent in 1800). It should be noted, however, that between 
1800 and 1809 the colonial regime resorted to  draconian tax measures 
and forced loans which may have raised revenues from 18.7 million pesos 
in 1794 to  as much as 68 million in 1809-19 Even taking into account the 
marked inflation o f the intervening years, the 1809 figure could have 
represented as much as 25 percent o f GDP.
Caution should be exercized in interpreting the data on colonial govern­
m ent revenues and expenditures. Both sides o f the ledger contain sums 
carried over from previous years and may thus exaggerate the actual flow 
o f  funds. For this reason, the G D P  estimate for 1800 takes the som ew hat 
low er estimates o f governm ent revenues and expenditure reported by 
H um bold t (1966a). For the republican period, well-known data on feder­
al governm ent activity is used in estim ating G D P, but the public sector
17 See Maddison (1983). Maddison notes that the contemporary service sector o f 
LDC economies averages between 24.6 and 44.2 percent o f GDP, depending on 
the m ethod used to estimate national income.
18 See Maddison (1983) and Bairoch (1976); Deane and Cole (1962: 282, 329-330); 
Ardent (1975: 200-204, 220-221). The public sector o f the U.S. economy did not 
spend more than five percent o f national income for most o f  the nineteenth cen­
tury, a lower ratio than that o f Mexico; see Historical Statistics (i960: 709-730).
19 Klein (1985: Table I). Data from the Mexico City treasury are found in TePaske 
(1976). Data from all 23 Mexican treasuries will be found in TePaske and Klein 
(Ms.).
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data also contain estimates o f  municipal and state expenditures (based 
on their p roportion  o f federal outlays in the Porfirian era).20
IV. TH E EXTERNAL SECTOR
As Mexico’s G D P  fell during the nineteenth  century, the country’s eco­
nom ic ties to  the rest o f the world actually grew in im portance. T hat is, 
M exico’s foreign trade declined m ore slowly than G D P  after 1800. Table 
11 measures the significance o f  foreign trade by estim ating the weight o f 
the external sector in GD P. Total foreign trade increased from 8.1 percent 
o f G D P  in 1800 to 12.3 percent in 1845 and then declined to  9.8 percent in 
1860.
Precise data on M exico’s foreign trade after independence are only avail­
able for scattered years. Table 12 presents this data together with data on 
the exports o f M exico’s principal trading partners during those years 
when Mexican im port data are missing. As this table indicates, M exico’s 
foreign trade fluctuated after independence as violently as the country’s 
relations w ith the major foreign powers.
In the period after I860, the external sector assumed far greater im por­
tance to  the econom y than at any po in t before. In assessing the impact o f 
the external sector during the colonial and early Independence period, 
therefore, the later data provide a much needed perspective. Trade was 
im portant to  the Mexican econom y even before the restoration o f the 
republic in 1867, but the liberal trade and tariff reforms in the 1870s and 
foreign investm ents that stim ulated export production during the Porfi- 
riato made Mexico a far m ore dependen t country at the end o f  the n ine­
teenth  century than ever before. W hile trade averaged about ten percent 
o f G D P  before 1870s, by the end o f the Porfiriato the significance o f the 
external sector had tripled to  m ore than 30 percent o f GDP.
W hile the perspective suggested by the Porfirian trade figures tends to 
reduce the significance o f  the export sector in earlier periods, the fact that 
foreign trade increased in relative im portance after independence is at 
least as interesting a result o f  these estimates. Moreover, the dependence 
o f  governm ent revenues on foreign trade increased even m ore rapidly 
than the G D P  ratio. The burden o f national taxation shifted from  inter-
20 State government expenditures for I860 are reported in Pérez Hernández (1862: 
193). In the period 1893-1903, municipal and state government expenditures 
amounted to approximately 38.4 percent o f federal governm ent outlays (Macedo 
1905: chap. 3.).
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nal productive and commercial activity to  the external sector. Thus, the 
political significance o f  foreign trade tended to  increase even faster than 
its share o f GD P.
V. C O N C LU SIO N S
T he new G D P  estimates presented in this paper docum ent the decline o f 
the Mexican economy from  1800 to  I860, but evidence from  the last dec­
ades o f  the eighteenth century indicate that the decline started well 
before that date. T he G D P  estimates depict a stagnant economy, w ith a 
m odest decline o f five percent in total product between 1800 and I860. In 
per capita term s, however, the decline reached nearly thirty percent. This 
decline in the productivity o f the Mexican econom y occurred as the 
industrializing nations o f the N orth  Atlantic were achieving unprece­
dented  rates o f increase. Thus, Mexico fell even further behind the indus­
trial nations.
T he sectoral product estim ates for the period from  1800 to  I860 record 
no significant shifts in the structure o f  the economy. The m ost severely 
depressed sector after independence was livestock production, the m ost 
resilient was agriculture. M ining and m anufacturing ou tpu t shares o f 
G D P  were lower in 1845 than in 1800. By I860, however, manufacturing 
had nearly recovered and the m ining sector exceeded its 1800 share o f 
GD P. In short, the independent econom y virtually replicated, at a lower 
level o f production, the structure o f  the colonial economy.
Two sectors did experience a m odest increase in G D P  share. Public sec­
to r expenditures declined absolutely and the proportion  o f  G D P  extract­
ed in revenue declined slightly, but real governm ent expenditures within 
the country increased both  absolutely and relative to G D P. Foreign trade 
also declined m ore slowly than GD P. Suggestions in the historical litera­
ture that the external sector lost im portance after independence are no t 
confirmed by the data which show a m arked increase o f  foreign trade as a 
p roportion  o f G D P  between 1800 and I860.21 W hile this increase was
21 Enrique Florescano y Alejandra Moreno Toscano suggested, in a paper written in 
1972, that the decline o f the external sectorafter independence caused a significant 
shift in economic activity, trade routes and the like. See Florescano and Moreno 
Toscano (1976). The argument o f  this paper remains sound, because it rested on 
analysis o f  the effects o f an absolute decline in foreign trade; the relative im por­
tance o f the external sector increased, however, even as the volume of transactions 
fell.
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no t as dramatic before I860 as afterw ards.it was nonetheless substantial 
by the standards o f  the period.
It is not possible to  estimate the value o f  the income foregone as a result 
o f the loss o f half the national territory. N or is it feasible to  estimate the 
benefits that could have been reaped by a diversion o f public spending 
from  military purposes to investm ent in hum an capital. Both would 
appear to  have been very large indeed.
As a trading partner, Mexico cannot be described as particularly signifi­
cant for the countries o f W estern Europe or the U nited States. N onethe­
less, the end o f Spain’s commercial m onopoly did increase the country’s 
trade with W estern Europe and the U nited States significantly. Spain’s 
share o f M exico’s im ports fell to insignificance following independence 
(Herrera Canales 1977: chap. 3). Moreover, opportunities for participa­
tion in internal as well as external trade increased, as som e Spanish m er­
chants left o rw ere expelled from  the country while English, German, and 
French m erchant houses established branches o r developed close trading 
relations with independent firms established by immigrants from these 
countries.22 The protections offered by their respective embassies repli­
cated the advantages Spanish-born merchants enjoyed in the colonial 
era.
T he decline in econom ic activity after independence adversely affected 
conservative projects which depended on the creation o f  a strong cen­
tralized state endow ed with sufficient resources to  defend the nation’s 
sovereignty over farflung territories and im pose social and political 
peace. A lthough governm ent revenues available to cover dom estic 
expenditures actually increased after independence, they were not suffi­
cient to  confront international com petition and dom estic conflict on a 
far larger scale than colonial governm ents had faced.
W hile conservative centralism was doom ed to  failure, liberalism was 
weakened by the economic decline as well. Liberal schemes to  liquidate 
inherited institutional obstacles to  capitalist econom ic m odernization 
lacked both  the plausibility and the dynamic social base that could have 
insured an easy victory. M exico’s political stalemate reflected the stagna­
tion and decline o f  the economy.
22 See, for example, Tenenbaum (1979). It is interesting to note that, unlike other 
Latin American countries, Mexico imposed no major obstacles to the participa­
tion o f foreign merchants in the internal economic life o f the country. For a con­
trary case, see Gootenberg (1982).
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Table 1
Population Estimates for Mexico, 1792-1862 (in Thousands)
Year Population Year Population
1793 5,229 1834 7,000
1803 5,837 1854 7,850
1808 6,500 1862 8,396
1810 6,122 1869 8,743
1820 6,204
Sources: Anuario Estadístico, México (1966-67 [1969]: 27); see also Navarro y
Noriega (1820: 30); H um boldt (1966a, I: book 2, chap. 4).
Table 2
Gross Domestic Product, 1800-1910
Current Pesos Pesos o f 1900
Year Total Per Capita Total Per Capita
(1000’s) (1000’s)
1800 240,318 40.06 333,057 55.51
1845 268,746 35.78 326,455 43.52
I860 292,371 36.54 314,865 39.36
1877 349,442 36.13 456,220 47.19
1895 736,467 58.30 903,214 71.50
1910 2,179,024 143.73 1,600,413 105.57
Source: See text.
Table 3
Sectoral O utput Estimates (Thousands of Pesos o f 1900)
Sector 1800 1845 1860 1877 1890 1910
Agriculture 72,891 87,498 84,987 113,937 179,660 339,170
Livestock 64,488 56,442 39,051 62,118 162,630 195,130
Forestry 10,088 9,744 4,673 10,789 2,470 5,590
Fish and Game 341 3,247 3,904 5,434 - -
Mining 27,318 20,331 30,535 47,649 56,940 135,070
Manufactures 74,306 59,823 68,104 74,005 115,700 238,680
Construction 2,018 1,948 1,857 2,801 5,330 13,260
Transport 8,311 8,117 7,737 11,308 29,640 42,770
Governm ent 14,123* 24,111 21,402 51,198 80,704 114,513
Commerce 55,670 55,194 52,615 76,981 152,100 309,010
Miscellaneous 3,503 - - - 118,040 207,220
Grand Total 333,057 326,455 314,865 456,220 903,214 1,600,413
Pesos Per Capita 55.51 43.52 39.36 47.19 71.50 105.57
* Excludes uncompensated overseas remittances o f fiscal revenues amounting to 
13,750,000 pesos.
Source: See text.
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Table 4
Sectoral O utput Per Capita, 1800-1910 (Pesos o f 1900)
Sector/Year 1800 1845 1860 1877 1895 1910
Agriculture 12.15 11.67 10.62 11.79 14.22 22.37
Livestock 10.75 7.53 4.88 6.43 12.87 12.87
Forestry 1.68 1.30 0.58 1.12 0.20 0.37
Fish and Game 0.06 0.43 0.49 0.56 - -
Mining 4.55 2.71 3.81 4.92 4.51 8.91
Manufacturing 12.39 7.97 8.52 7.66 9.16 15.74
Construction 0.34 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.42 0.87
Transportation 1.38 1.08 0.97 1.17 2.35 2.82
Governm ent 2.35* 3.21 2.68 5.29 6.39 7.55
Commerce 9.28 7.36 6.58 7.96 12.04 20.38
Miscellaneous 0.58 - - - 9.34 13.69
Total 55.51 43.52 39.36 47.19 71.50 105.57
* Excludes uncompensated overseas remittances amounting to 2.29 pesos per 
capita.
Source: See Table 3-
Table 5
Gross Domestic Product, by Sectors, 1800-1900 (Percentages)
Sector/Year 1800 1845 1860 1877 1895 1910
Agriculture 21.9 26.8 27.0 25.0 19.9 21.2
Livestock 19.4 17.3 12.4 13.6 18.0 12.2
Forestry 3.0 3.0 1.5 2.4 0.3 0.3
Fish and Game 0.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 - -
Mining 8.2 6.2 9.7 10.4 6.3 8.4
Manufacturing 22.3 18.3 21.6 16.2 12.8 14.9
Construction 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8
Transportation 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.3 2.7
Government 4.2* 7.4 6.8 11.2 8.9 7.2
Commerce 16.7 16.9 16.7 16.9 16.8 19.3
Miscellaneous 1.1 - - - 13.1 12.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: This table is based on the deflated estimates o f sectoral output reported on 
Table 3. See Appendix for current peso estimates (which yield slightly different 
percentage figures).
* Does not include net fiscal remittances to Spanish treasury. Total government 
revenues, including these remittances, amounted to 7.8 percent o f colonial 
income.
Source: Table 3.
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Table 6





















1828 70.19 80.52 187.84
1829 88.34 80.42 199.93
1830 109.41 123.19 240.75
1831 112.07 248.19
1832 125.08 128.78 153.17





1848 98.49 116.96 114.15
1849 66.29 101.43 84.77
1850 40.99
1856 76.66
1860 125.0 84.3 78.31
1863 97,79 54.03
1869 79.93 99.72
1870 60.56 181.47 130.90
1871 38.51 139.19
1873 91.61 53.45 122.18
1877 144.7
1879 82.31 138.43 64.63
1881 230.80 166.12 47.57
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Table 6 (Cont.)




















1895 145.0 110.16 158.38 230.82
1896 142.8 99.71 62.35 16.60
1897 184.3 136.97 350.58 219.22
1898 175.0 114.60 347.15 528.71
1899 176.4 68.85 318.18 402.76
1900 154.3 205.20 297.47 304.69







Notes: The 1877 national estimate in the table differs from both Busto and the Cole­
gio de México estimates. The former produced an aggregate estimate of national 
maize output which implied a per capita output o f 549.3 kilos in 1877.The Colegio se­
ries (cited above for the Porfirian data which appear reliable) cut the Busto estimate 
by about half to 282.5. Neither o f these estimates seems plausible. Some o f the output 
data for Nuevo León later in the period reach these levels, but only for the three 
towns which exported large surpluses to other areas. Sindico (1975) reports statewide 
maize output beginning in 1873 for scattered years; between 1873 and 1903, per capita 
output for the state as a whole averaged 125.98 kilos and exceeded 158 kilos in only 
three o f 21 years. See Coatsworth (1976).
Sources: For national estimates: 1800 is the Q uirós’ estimate (see text), 1845 and I860 
are imputed, 1877 is based on the reports submitted to the Ministry o f the Treasury 
and published in Busto (1880, III), and 1892 to 1907 are in Estadísticas (n.d.: 62).The 
Mexico City data are taken from documents in the AAM, Ramo de Alcabalas, vol. 2, 
which provide m onthly data on the quantities o f agricultural products entering the 
city gates. Mexico City population estimates are from Orozco y Berra (1973). The 
Nuevo León series are based on data in Sindico (1975).
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Table 7
Per Capita Production and Consum ption of W heat, Rye, and Sugar (Kilograms)
Year W heat W heat Flour1 Rye Sugar














1845 17.5 78.02 3.7
1850
I860 15.0 4.4 8.9
1877 17.33 12.04 65.1
1892 17.4 8.6 78.7
1893 18.8 8.6 80.4
1894 18.8 10.1 81.8
1895 19.3 7.6 94.2
1896 15.1 11.3 94.3
1897 18.4 10.8 86.3
1898 19.4 8.6 94.2
1899 19.8 10.1 87.8
1900 20.1 9.3 93.1
1901 18.3 9.4 95.1
1 Pérez Hernández (1862) estimated wheat flour output per capita at 27.9 kilos; 
the I860 figure here is discussed in the text.
2 Mexico City consum ption; all other data are national estimates.
3 Several estimates o f wheat production in 1877 exist; both Busto (1880) and
the Estadísticas (n .d .) put it at 35 kilos per capita.
4 Rye output is estimated by Busto and the Estadísticas (n .d .) at 24 kilos per
capita.
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Table 7 (Cont.)
Per Capita Production and Consum ption o f W heat, Rye, and Sugar (Kilograms)
Year W heat W heat Flour1 Rye Sugar
1902 19.2 9.1 115.9
1903 19.9 8.3 111.1
1904 17.2 9.7 120.0
1905 19.4 8.7 108.3
1906 20.2 8.9 107.1




Sources: For all products, the series beginning in 1892 are taken from Estadísticas (n.d.). 
For wheat, the 1800 figure is from Quirós (1973), that o f 1802 is from Ortiz de Ayala 
(1968), and the figures for 1845, 1860 and 1877 are explained in the text. For wheat 
flour, rye and sugar, the 1792 data are from the Revillagigedo census and refer to 
Mexico City consum ption only. The wheat flour series for Mexico City from 1817-2 3, 
1834-38 and 1843-45 is taken from excise tax collection data in AAM, Ramo de Alca­
balas, vol. 2, and from data in Orozco y Berra (1973). These sources provided the 
Mexico City data for rye as well. The 1860 estimates o f rye and sugar are from Pérez 
Hernández (1862).
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Table 8





















1792 0.125 2.14 0.39
1800 0.095 0.78 0.43
1834-38 0.086 1.02 0.34
1843 0.134 0.80 0.37
1844 0.130 0.85 0.42
1845 0.128 0.070 0.76 0.40 0.36 0.20
1849 0.162 0.82 0.31
1850 0.185 0.82 0.26
1851 0.71
I8603 0.053 0.37 0.16
1861 0.094 1.39 0.30
18774 0.086 0.11 0.10
1878 0.084 0.11 0.10
1897 0.081 0.11 0.05
1898 0.075 0.14 0.05
1899 0.067 0.12 0.05
1900 0.079 0.12 0.06
1901 0.078 0.11 0.05
1902 0.081 0.12 0.06
1903 0.078 0.12 0.06
1904 0.072 0.11 0.06
1905 0.077 0.12 0.06
1906 0.079 0.13 0.06
1907 0.080 0.13 0.06
1 The m utton data include goats from 1897 to 1907.
2 This figure is for Cuernavaca.
3 Pérez Hernández (1862) gives higher I860 estimates o f 0.118, 0.66 and 0.30 
respectively.
4 The Estadística (n .d .) reports figures for 1878; we have used their estimate for 
constructing the 1877 G D P estimate, and thus cite it for this year.
Sources: The 1756 figure (which refers to Cuernavaca, not Mexico City) is from Barrett 
(1974: 533-534). The rest o f the Mexico City data are based on excise tax collections 
reported in sources cited in Table 3. National output in 1800 is from Quirós (1973). 
The national estimates for 1865 and I860 are discussed in the text.The 1877 figures are 
from the Estadísticas (n.d.: 84), as are all the national data from 1897 to 1907.The 1878 
figures are from Busto (1880). They appear to be the principal source for the estimates 
in the Estadísticas (n.d.).
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Table 9
Estimates o f Manufacturing O utput 
(Value Added in Thousands o f Current Pesos)
Products 1800 1845 1860
A. Food Processing
Sugar Products 5534 - 3373
Bread and Baking Flour 4000 - -
Mezcal 1800 - 2577
Chocolate 415 - 780
Snow and Ice 400 - -
Pulque 3785 - 1488
W ine and Liquors - - 1176
B. Chemicals
Wax Candles 74 0 3 - 8582
Matches - - 4340
Soap 3395 - 2692
Gunpow der 700 - 85
Vegetable Oils 500 - 124
Paints and Dyes 100 - -
Paper - - 6366
C. Textiles
Cottons 2270 2700 3162
W oolens 6201 2700 2367
Silks 100 500 -
Palm and Agave 350 350 350
D. Tobacco Products 7061 - 4320
E. Leather Goods
Sheepskins and Chamois 5488 - -
Saddlery 50 - -
F. Shoes and Hats
Shoes 3349 - -
Sombreros 500 - -
G. Miscellaneous
Silver Goods 300 - -
Carriages 200 - -
Games, Musical Instruments 350 - 73
Lacemaking, Ribbons 150 - -
Goldsmithing 50 - -
Wax Chandlers 90 - -
Porcelain and Crystal - - 1638
H. Iron, Steel, Munitions - 7626 -
I. N ot separately estimated - 36079 17053
Totals 54,541 49,955 65,866
Sources: See text.
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Table 10
Precious Metals Coined in Mexican Mints, 1800-1859 (Millions o f Pesos)
Year O utput Year O utput Year O utput
1800 18.7 1820 11.7 1840 12.7
1801 16.6 1821 9.4 1841 13.5
1802 18.8 1822 9.8 1842 14.0
1803 23.2 1823 9.8 1843 12.1
1804 27.1 1824 9.6 1844 13.7
1805 27.2 1825 8.9 1845 18.51
1806 24.7 1826 8.2 1846 15.7
1807 22.2 1827 10.4 1847 16.4
1808 21.7 1828 10.2 1848 19.2
1809 26.2 1829 12.2 1849 19.4
1810 19.3 1830 11.6 1840 19.4
1811 14.2 1831 10.3 1851 18.2
1812 9.6 1832 12.2 1852 18.2
1813 9.4 1833 12.2 1853 17.0
1814 12.2 1834 13.0 1854 17.2
1815 8.6 1835 11.8 1855 18.0
1816 10.7 1836 11.5 1856 18.7
1817 10.3 1837 11.5 1857 23.31
1818 13.1 1838 13.3 1858 20.0
1819 13.5 1839 12.5 1859 18.8
1 These figures include production of nonm inted metals exports; for 1845, the 
data are in Mayer (1853, II: 99); for 1857, the data are in Pérez Hernández 
(1862: 135).
Sources: For 1800-1854, Orozco y Berra (1857); for 1855-1859, Pérez Hernández (1862: 
135).
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Table 11
Expenditures o f the Federal Governm ent o f  Mexico, 1822-1860 
(Millions o f Pesos)
Year Expenditures Year Expenditures
1822 13.51 1841 20.3
1823 11.2 1842 26.6
1824 15.2* 1843 29.2
1825 9.82 1844 25.3
1825-26 14.6 1845 19.6
1826-27 13.5 1846 27.85
1827-28 11.0 1847 25.0
1828-29 12.2 1848-49 11.6
1829-30 11.9 1849-50 15.8
1830-31 16.4 1850-51 12.6
1831-32 15.7s 1851-52 8.6
1832-33 20.64 1852-53 14.75
1833-34 18.6 1853-54 15.23
1834-35 12.71 1854-55 23.45
1835-36 25.0 1855-56 12.95
1836-37 17.6 1856-57 13.05
1837-38 16.1 1857-58 15.95
1839 25.7 1858-59 16.95
1840 19.9 1859-60 16.65
1 Budget; actual expenditures not available.
2 Six months.
3 May be incomplete; see source.
4 Revenues; expenditure data not available.
5 These figures are rough estimates by Romero for years when no data could 
be found.
Source: Memoria de Hacienda, México (1870 : 67 ff.).
Table 12
Foreign Trade as Percent o f GDP, 1800-1910
Year Exports Imports Total
1800 4.3 3.8 8.1
1845 4.3 8.1 12.3
1860 4.6 5.2 9.8
1877 9.3 9.3 18.6
1895 13.6 10.3 23.9
1910 17.5 13.0 30.5
1 Average for 1796-1805.
2 Trade data are for 1844.
3 No im port estimate available; assumed equal to exports. 
Sources: See Table 13.
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Table 13
External Trade Data, 1821-1860 (Millions o f Pesos)








1826 7.6 15.5 3.9
1827 12.2 14.9 10.6 5.2















1843 12.13 23.5 6.9 2.8












1856 13.64 21.64 3.7
1857 16.44 13.94 3.6
1858 16.24 11.44 3.3
1859 7.94 15.32 2.9
1860 13.4 15.2 5.3
1 Veracruz only. 2 Veracruz and Alvarado only. 3 Exports o f  gold, silver and palo 
de tinte only. 4 Veracruz and Tampico only.
Sources: Herrera Canales (1977: chap. 2); Lerdo de Tejada (1967); Memoria de Hacienda, 
Mexico (l8/U: 236); Romero (1898:173-174); Stevens (Ms. 1983: chap. 5); Diaz (1974,1: 
302 and Tables 5, 9, 13 and 19).
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Table 14
Sectoral O utput Estimates, 1800-1877 (Thousands of Current Pesos)
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Table 14 (Cont.)
Sectoral O utpu t Estimates, 1800-1877 (Thousands of Current Pesos)
Sector Product 1800 1845 1860
Shoes and Hats 3,849 NES NES
Iron and Steel NES NES 7,626
Miscellaneous 1,140 NES 1,711
O ther Products - 44,038 9,427
Construction 1,481 1,616 1,796
Transport 6,100 6,733 7,483
Government 10,367 20,000 20,699
Commerce 40,862 45,782 50,887
Miscellaneous 2,571 - -
Grand Total 240,318 268,413 292,371
1 Includes both gold and silver. 
NES =  N ot estimated separately.
